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1-riedman's (1956) essay  "The Quantity Theory of  Money: A Restatement" that appeared as the  first 
chapter of his Studies in the Quanti,fy 7;"leory  of Money set the agenda for a substantial part of  the 
macroeconomic debate of the 1960s and 1970s. Laidler (1994, p. 4) refers to  it as marking the 
beginning of  the "Monetarist episode", even though it deals only with one part of the monetarist 
paradigm. Although in subsequent years Friedman wrote much on the quantity theory, this paper 
remains his best exposition of  it. It is superior to his more detailed 1970 exposition because here, in 
c:ontrast to his 1970 paper, he employs a theoretical framework that is congenial to him. and also 
because it is  more closely related to his subsequent empirical work. l 
Its importance for the history of  monetary thec  y  is  not the only reason this paper deserves 
ztudy. Another is  its expository technique. Friedman is one of  the  most accomplished expositors of 
our profession. A study of  his rhetclric may  therefore teach the rest of  us  how to present our work 
His  I956 paper  is  a particularly good example of  his rhetorical skills because, as discused below. 
ivriti~ig  it presented an unusually challenging rhetorical task. 
A third reason for studying Friedman's rhetoric is to elucidate the rhetoric of economics. Thus 
IvlcCloskey (1985) has argued that we will become better economists if  we understand what 
xguments persuade us  and why. Robert Solow (1988). too. sees nothing but good coming from the 
!  tudy of how economists persuade each other. It is therefore not surprising that the rhetoric of 
i:conomics has become a flourishing subfield. McCloskey (1994) list sixty-eight books and  papers 
1)ublished in the period 1982 to 1994 that are concerned with the rhetoric of economics, though 
many ot them deal with this topic only peripherally. 
This is  not the first study of  Friedman's rhetoric. Harry Johnson (1971) has studied the 
rhetoric and strategy of both the Keynesian and  monetarist revolutions, and has much to say that is 
-elevant for Friedman's I956 essay. And so does a recent paper by Roger Backhouse (1994). Both 
;ire discussed below. 
It should be obvious that  I am using the term rhetoric not in  the pejorative sense of  a shell game 
or an exposition that, while superficially persuasive is fundamentally flawed. Instead.  L  follow McCloskey (I985 p. 29) who defined rhetoric as "the art of speaking (or1 . . . the study of  how 
people persuade", atid hence as a basic component of good science. All sciences, including 
mathematics (see Davis and Hersch. 1987) use rhetoric.  As John Campbell (1987, p. 69) in his 
study of  Darwin's rhetoric remarked: "Even scientific discoilrse must be persuasive to rescue insight 
from indifference, misunderstanding. contempt, or rejection." In this spirit when 1 suggest belou 
that Friedman presented his argument in a certain way because that was an effective rhetorical 
device, I am not accusing him of departing from the highest standards of intellectual integrity.  As 
long as one does not use an argument that one knows, or should know, to be flawed, it is entirely 
appropriate, and indeed an aid to the reader, to use that argument and exposition that will prove 
most effective. Moreover, I am not  implying that Friedman consciously employed a certain mode of 
exposition because it is good  rhetoric.  A brilliant ex~csitor  can do that without being aware of  it 
I. The Hegemony of Keynesian Theory 
For two or three decades following the publication of  Keynes' (1936) General Theon. the quantity 
theory was usually  treated as an outmoded approach.7 Ac  Laldler (1991, pp. 291-92) reports: "Ar no 
time in history was the quantity theory in  greater disrepute than in  the two decades following the 
second World War." Thus in  1951 Seymour Harris (p. 183) wrote that the relegation of monetary 
policy:  "to a secondary role resls not only on history but also on the development of Keynesian 
economics. It is  increasingly  iashionable to attack the problem [of excess demand] through fiscal 
policy." Similarly, Lawrence Ritter (1959 p. 120) pomted out that: "the view has been  w~dely 
expressed that anti-inflationary monetary policy is unlikely to be successful because of offsetting 
movements in  velocity."  Alvin  Hansen (1957, p. SO), who was widely considered the leading 
Amer~can  macro-economist of his generation wrote that: 
I  think  we should do well  to eliminate once and for all, the phrase 'velocity of cir- 
culation'  from  our  vccabulary.  Instead,  we should  simply  speak  of  the  ratio ot 
money to aggregate spending. The phrase ~jelocity  of circulation is,  I feel, unforru- 
nate because those who employ  it tend  to make an independent entity out of  it and 
imbue it  with a soul. 'The little manikin is placed on the stage, and the audience is 
led  to believe that it  is  endowed with  the power of making decisions directing and 
controlling the flow of aggregate spending.  In fact  it is  nothing of  the sort. It  is a 
mere residual. We should get on much better if  we substitute the word  'ratio'. Thr: 
little manikin would then be forced back into oblivion where it properly belongs. 
Similarly, in Britain the Radcliffe Committee stated: We  have  not made more use  of  this concept [velocityj because we  cannot find any 
reason for supposing, or any experience  in monetary history  indicating,  that there 
is any limit to the velocity of circulation:  it is  a statistical concept that tells us noth- 
ing  directly  of  the  motivation  that  influences  the  level  of  total  demand.  (Com- 
mittee on the Working of the Monetary System, 1959, p. 133.) 
By  no  means all economists went that far, and  many did  important work on the demand for 
money and velocity. Thus William Baumol (1952) and James Tobin (1956. 1958) developed 
models of  the transactions and precautionary demands for money, while other economists did 
txtensive empirical work on the demand for money. (See for instance. Doblin, 1951: Garvey 
959: Tobin. 1947.) Moreover, in  1952 many prominent economisrs signed a statement, which 
while hardly a ringing affirmation of the quantity theory, did give some role to the quantity of 
money: "The amount that individuals and businesses desire to spend is  powerfully influenced both 
tly the volume of credit that is available to them and  by  the volume of  money and other liquid 
;sets that  they already possess." (P,nonymous, 1952) And  in  the same year as Friedman's essay 
there appeared Don  Patinkin's (19515) classic reworking of  the qua~itity  theory and of  monetary 
theory in general. Moreover. as Johnson (1971) has pointed out the standard IS-LM model seems 
to imply a stable demand function tbr money. 
But even those who considered the  money demand function worth investigating, and allowed a 
certain role for  monetary policy, generally did so within a Keynesian framework in  which the 
supply of money  is  simply one of  several variables that determine money income, and is far fron~ 
t~eing  the  most  important one. 
Such a strong conviction that the quantity theory was an outmoded theory presented Friedman 
with a difficult task. And so did the fact that as  Laidler (1991) has pointed out, debates about ihe 
quantity theory have a strong ideological element. This makes it hard to persuade those on the 
other side of  the debate. Moreover.  many economists were skeptical of any work originating  in the 
(-hicago economics department, because they rejected its  laissez-faire tradition. 
2. Methodology 
In his attack on the well entrenched Keynesian consensus (also called the  neo-classical synthesis) 
Friedman greatly benefitted from a change in the profession's methodological preferences, a 
change for which he himself was  in large part responsible.  Three years earlier in  his famous methodological paper (Friedman. 1953) he had argued that theories should be evaluated primarily 
by  their ability to predict, and no[: by the realism of their assumptions, or by  their descriptive 
realism or by their concordance with personal experiences and similar types of casual empiricism. 
(See Hirsch and de Marchi. 1990.) Although  Friedman's methodological essay has been much 
criticized by professional  methodologists, it has had great appeal to other economists. (See Boland. 
1979. p. 503) 
This new  methodology helpe8d  Friedman to build a case against the Keynesian consensus in 
several ways. First, any change  im the methodological criteria for evaluating theories iinplic~tly 
calls into question the validity of theories, such as Keynesian theory, that had been accepted on the 
basis of the previous criteria. Second, Keynesian theory had had an advantage over the quantity 
theory because its assumptions seem more realistic. The assumprions of [he popular Keynesian 
mulriplier-accelerator model. thar  consumption depends on income and  investment depends on die 
change in  sales. seem highly credible. More generally. since most economists themselves are i~ot 
severely capital rationed. it  may :seem natural  to them  that expenditures depend more on income 
than on money holdings. But Friedman's new methodology allowed him to shift the focus of the 
discussion from such casual cmp:ricisni and emphasis on assumptions to the question of how well 
the  theory predicts. On this he could point to the empirical chapters of the book that. on the whole. 
offered successful predictions based on the quantity  theory. Moreover, he could use his "as if" 
methodology to counter the complaint that the quantity  theory is a "black box" that does not 
3  explain in  nearly as much detail as the Keynesian theory. just how and why income changes.  (Set 
Johnson.  1971) 
Backhouse (1994)  has recently argued that any gain than Friedman derived from his seeming 
use of the "methodology of posiiive economics"  is  unwarranted, because Friedman did not really 
use [hat methodology. He argue!; that from a reading of  Friedman's methodological essay one 
would expect Friedman to justify his theory by  "providing evidence for [he success of its 
predictions. perhaps with additional evidence concerning its simplicity, elegance and fruitful~~esr." 
What we find. however. appear's to be completely different (Backhouse, 1994 p. 189) Thus he 
reads Friedman's claim that his essay is  founded on the Chicago tradition as an argument from authority. He also points out that what Friedman presents is  more an approach than a testable 
theory. For example Friedman does not discuss the measurement problems arising from using 
permanent income in place of mesared income, and from changes in  the definition of money. And 
his "emphasis is on opinions and beliefs rather than on proof or demonstration." (Backhouse. 1994. 
P  187) 
Backhouse is  right if  one considers Friedman's essay in  isolation from the other work that he 
and his students have done on the quantity theory: and most of that work was published only 
subsequently. If so the essay does  not resonate with Friedman's explicit methodological principles. 
or for that matter with his usual methodological practice. (See Hirsch and de Marchi.  1990.) 
But when viewed  in another context the inconsistency disappears. If one treats the essay as an 
intr~ductory  statement intended  merely to whet the readers' interest in  the quantity theory. and nor 
as the presentation of a completed research  project. then the deficiencies that Backhouse lists can 
readily be forgiven. The first chap~:er  of a book  - and that is what Friedman's essay is  - can 
legitimately discuss a general approach rather than a testable theory. and can present its conclusions 
in  the form of opinions. Moreover. while an introductory chapter will often indicate the predicribe 
capability and fruitfulness of the theory by summarizing the results shown in subsequent chapters - 
and Friedman does that - it will typically not present compelling evidence on these issues.  It is also 
common for an  introductory chapter to devote considerable space to the theory's provenance. 
3. Friedman's Response to the Challenge 
Despite the just discussed  methodological advantage Friedman faced a daunting task in  trying to 
induce economists to relinquish the Keynesian consensus, and to return to a theoretical approach 
which most of them had previously abandoned. His initial objective was therefore not to convince 
his readers that the quantity theory is  necessarily correct. but that it is a theory that tnight be worth 
reconsidering. so that his paper is worth taking seriously. 
One possible way to induce readers to reconsider a theory they had previously rejected, is  to 
tell  them right at outset that what they will find presented here is something that differs sharply 
from the old, stale doctrine that  they had previously rejected. Hence, they can accept the new 
theory without incurring the embarrassment of having to admit thht they had  made a m~stake  when they previously rejected the quantity theory. Friedman does this by  starting his essay as follows: 
The quantity theory of  money is a term evocative of a general approach rather than 
a label for a well-defined theory. The exact content of  the approach varies from a 
truism defining the term  "velocity"  to an allegedly rigid and unchanging ratio bet- 
ween the quantity of  money - defined  in one way or another  - and the  price level 
... [I]t is  clear that the general approach [of the quantity theory] fell into disrepute 
... and only recently has been slowly re-emerging  into professional respectability. 
The  present volume is  partly a symptom of  this re-emergence and  partly a conti- 
nuation of  an  aberrant tradition.  Chicago was one of  the few  academic centers at 
which  the  quantity  theory continued to be a central and  vigorous  part of  the oral 
tradition. ... The quantity  theory  that  retained this role differed  sharply  from  the 
atrophied and  rigid caricature that is  so frequently described by  the proponents of 
the new  income-expenditure approach - and with some justice to judge by  the much 
of  the  literature on  policy  that was spawned  by  quantity  theorists. ... [N]o syste- 
matic statement of  this theory as developed at Chicago exists.  ... And  this is as  it 
should be, for  the Chicago tradition was  not a rigid system, an  unchanged ortho- 
doxy, but a way of looking at things. It was a theoretical approach that insisted that 
money does  matter  - that any interpretation of short-term  movements in  economic 
activity is  likely to be  seriously at fault  if  it neglects monetary changes and  reper- 
cussions and  if  it leaves unexplained why  people are willing to hold  the particular 
nominal quantity of  money  in existence. The purpose of  this introduction is  nor  to 
enshrine  -  or  should  I  say  inter  -  a definitive  version  of  the  Chicago  tradition. 
(Friedman. 1956, p. 3) 
This passage has been much criticized.  Don  Patinkin (1972, 1981. Chapters  10 and  11) and 
Harry Johnson  (1  962) argue persuasively that the theory that Friedman presents differs sharply 
from what had  been taught at Chicago, and  instead has Keynesian origins.  In  1964 Friedman 
himself acknowledged a strong Keynesian influent,: on his formulation of  the money demand 
function (Friedman. 1964). Even  so, he maintains that  it should be considered a development of 
the  Ch~cago  tradition.  (See Friedman.  1972: and  alw Parkin. 1986) Others have crituzed the 
above-clted passage because Friedman ignored work on the quantity theory done outside Chicago 
(See Humphrey, 1971; 1973; Tavlas, 1976: Patinkin,  1981, 1981. Ch.  11; Laidler, 1993.) A 
complication is  that. as  Tavlas (1997) points out. leading Chicago economists advocated public 
works expenditures as a way of getting additional money into circulation, thus advocating 
"Keynesian"  policy for quantity-theory reasons. Despite these complexities  I  will refer to 
Fr~edman's  theory as a quantity theory. in part because that need  not imply that his essay is 
necessarily in  the Chicago tradition, and  in  part because that is  the phrase customarily used  to 
descnbe his theory 
Apart from the disputed issue of  paternity a major (and entirely legitimate) purpose of  this passage seems to be  to shake the confidence of  the reader in  the belief that she already know all she 
need  to know about the quantity theory to  be able to reject it.4 So Friedman emphasizes that th~. 
quantity theory is a broad approach, a way of looking at the macro economy and not a specific 
model that the reader previously repted. To stress the difference between his approach and  what 
one might call the naive version of the quantity theory Friednian writes that he accepts three 
:standard and  telling criticisms of  the naive version: that it confuses the quantity theory, which  is an 
f:mpirical  theory, with the MV=PT identity, that it claims that velocity is  numerically stable (a 
(:laim  strongly rejected by  the data during the Grea: Depression and World War II), and that it 
ignores the problem of defining money. By  telling the reader:  "yes, you are right to have rejected 
for these reasons the 'atrophied and rigid' version of  the quantity theory,"  Friedman tells him  that 
he  is on  his side.  Moreover, by  saying that the quantity theory is  now re-emerging Friedman is 
sending a warning to any readers who might want to make herself seem up to date by  disparaging 
the quantity theory. 
Friedman's description of  the (Chicago quantity theory not as a finished theory, but as an 
evolving research program not only helps to overcome the natural reluctance to reconsider what 
one had  previously rejected. but has an additional rhetorical advantage:  it makes the theory look 
like a source of  substantial research opportunities. And  so does the  inclusion in  the book of four 
significant empirical studies. One need  not be entirely committed to a public choice theorv of 
academia to conclude that a belief that a theory can be  used  to generate numerous papers makes 
that theory attractive to academics.  In  addition, as Johnson (1971  ) has pointed out. Friedman's 
analysis implies a shift of  the research agenda away from large econometric models. That made the 
quantity theory appealing to young economists who can work on such models only as junior 
members of a team. 
The disparaging tone of  Friedman's discussion of  the policy recommendations spawned by 
quantity theorists outside Chicago, while unfair to these quantity theorists, could also be expected 
to  make the quantity theory attractive to most  economist^.^ It is a commonplace that part of  thr 
enthusiasm for Keynesian theory in  the 1930s and in  the early postwar period was due to it 
providing intellectual support for policies that many economists found attractive for other reasons. Finally, by describing the quantity theory broadly as: "a theoretical approach that insisted that 
money does matter" and as an insistence on analyzing equilibrium in  the market for money. 
Friedman makes it difficult for readers to say thct they reject the quantity theory. A subtle shit't of 
focus accomplishes this task. A typical Keynesian of, say 1950 vintage would not deny that the 
money market must equilibriate, but would argue that as an empirical matter the effect of a change 
in  the money supply on nominal  Income is  very small, and that most of the observed changes in 
nominal  income are the due to other factors. Reestablishing equilibrium in  the money market even 
in the face of a substantial increase in the money supply results in only very small increase in 
income, because of a highly interest elastic demand for money and a highly interest inelastic 
marginal efficiency of investment. By stating - at an abstract level a basic principle of economics - 
that the money market must be in equilibrium for iicome to be at its equilibrium level, Friednlan 
by-passes this response, and induces the reader to be receptive to his message. 
4. Friedman's Choice of  Paradigms 
An  alternative way  Friedtnan could have responded to the prevailing opposition to the quantit) 
theory  is  to have presented his analysis.  not as part of the Chicago quantity theory, but as a 
modified version of Keynesian theory. He could have derived the standard quantity-theory  results 
from a model with a high interest elasticity of expenditures and a low interest elasticity of a stable 
money demand function. and with there being greater shocks to the money supply than to the other 
standard Keynesian  variable^.^ That would have justified  focusing attention. as Friedman does. on 
the money  market instead of on income-expenditure  relations. 
By  doing so Friedman could have avoided asking h~s  readers to abandon the paradigm they 
were familiar with. But the advantage of  that should not be exaggerated. While the quantity theory 
and Keynesian theory are differmt paradigms in  the lose sense of the term "paradigm" they are not 
d~fferent  paradigms in  the sweeping Kuhnian sense of the term. Roth deal with the same problem. 
determining nominal income, and by 1956 there was no longer any serious problem of 
communication.  Even so. Friedman would have benefitted at least to some extent by presenting his 
work in  Keynesian terms. Why didn't he? 
One possible explanation is that. although he at one time accepted a part of  Patinkin's argument that  much of his essay is  in an important way Keynesian (Patinkin, 1981, Chapter  11  1. 
that was not how he thought of it at the time he  wrote his essay, and he did not w,nt  to sail under 
false  color^.^ Another possibility is that he was influenced by a sense of loyalty to his Chicago 
teachers and colleagues 
A third possibility is  that, as Johnson (1971) has suggested, in  presenting a seemingly new 
theory it  helps to absorb the valid parts of the old thzory under "confusing new names". How 
plausible is  this explanation? It is true that by making the demand for money a function of the 
interest rate the other Keynesian variables are allowed to enter by the back door, something that 
Friedman does not make explicit. But  it is hard to see how Friedman, the author of a price-theory 
text, could have avoided including the rate of interest in  the money demand function, and there is 
no reason to think  that he believed that by introducing the Keynesian variables only indirectly he 
would make his essay more acceptable.  8 
Another possible explanation i:;  that he thought that  if he  presented his analysis as an 
oulgrowth of Keynesian theory he ,would have found it hard to persuade Keynesians that  ir is a 
useful outgrowth. Keynesians would not have welcomed his positive heuristic of focusing on the 
market for money and letting the other Keynesian variables enrer only indirectly through their 
effects on the cost of holding money. That was alien to their research heuristics and would have 
devalued much of the work they had done since 1936. 
In addition. Friedman would then have had to contend with the widespread view that the 
interest elasticity of expenditures  is: very low, while the interest elasticity of the liquidity preference 
function is high, and that both the liquidity preference function and the marginal efficiency of 
investment are unstabk9 Given the available econometric techniques it would have been extremely 
difficult for Friedman to make a convincing case. 
Furthermore, Friedman's metliodological preference is to evaluate theories by testing their 
central implications.  He therefore preferred to test his theory not by testing assumptions about 
elasticities, but by the success his students had had  in using it to explain a wide variety of events. 
Besides.  Friedman is uncomfortable working with the simplistic IS-LM model that underlies tht: 
interest-elasticities approach. 10 5.  Friedman's Portfolio Analysis 
Friedman devotes about half his essay to developing the microfoundations for his money demand 
function, thus answering the objection that the quantity theory is  mechanistic.  that  it reads as 
though money has a velocity of circulation that is independent of human volition and maximizing 
behavior. l1 These microfoundations brought the quantity theory up-to-date.  It is true they wen:  nut 
rigorous enough to satisfy all economists (see Habn, 1958). or nearly as  elaborate and rigorous as 
those provided by Patinkin in  the same year, nor would they be considered adequate by  the 
prevailing standards of the  1990s.12 But in the 1950s they did show that the quantity theory was a 
theory capable of sufficient refi~~en~ent,  and not just a vague common sense rationalization of some 
observed correlations. 
By presenting his portfolio theory in ,om(  detail  Friedman gained another. though perhaps 
unintciided advantage. As h? points out:  "Almost every economist will accept the general lines  01' 
..  .  lrhis] analysis on  a purely formal and abstract level" (Friedman. 1956, p. 15).  With a large 
part  of  the essay thus being unconrroversial  Friedman reduces some readers' potential feelings of 
antagonism to a paper by a Chicago economist who is advocating an "old fashioned" theory that 
has the unpleasant  policy  implication that fiscal policy is  ineffective. 
Friedman commences his portfolio analysis with a point that though obvious by hindsight had 
been largely ignored and that sets the stage for his detailed portfolio analysis: Since money is  a 
capital good that provides a flow of services, the theory ot dzina~id  for money can be subsurnt:d 
under the general theory of demand for capital goods. This implies that one should be loath  to talk 
about velocity being stable because payment habits and customs are stable. Habits and customs 
relating to transportation are also stable, but economists analyze the demand for cars by  looking at 
relative prices and incume. 
Friedtnan then introduces an innovation derived from his work on the permanent income 
theory. This is  to expand the traditional concept of wealth to include human wealth. so that, iven 
the rate of interest  it is arbitrary whether one uses wealth or income as the budget constraint. 
Although this is  hardly a  matter of great importance for the quantity theory.  it is an elegant point 
likely to make readers appreciate the essay. 13 After that Friedman sets out a portfolio balance model containing money, consols. short-term 
~iecurities,  equities, physical capital and human capital. and discusses the yields of  these assets.  Hc 
 hen simplifies the analysis by taking the ratios of certain unobservable yields to observable yidds 
;IS  constant, so that he obtains the following demand function for nominal money 
t  1)MIP =f( rb, re,  llP(dP/dt).w, YIP, u) 
where M is nominal money, P is the price level, rb and re the yields on bonds and equities. dPldt 
(he  expected  rate of inflation, w the ratio of nonhuman to human wealth, Y income and u  tastes. 
From this he derives an equation for income (Y) 
12) Y  =v(rb.  re,  llP{dPldt},w, YIP. u)M. 
3y writing the equation in  this form Friedman makes it clear that he treats velocity as determined 
by  maximizins behavior, and not by payment habits and institutions. He also makes it explicit that 
Iknowing the quantity of money does nor allow one to determine the equilibrium level of income 
~nless  one also knows the structure of interest  rates and the level of real income. 
In  the following passage Friedman (1956. p. 15) explains, in anticipation of his work on the 
"missing equation" (Friedman. 1970). that: Even under the most favorable conditions, for example 
:hat  the demand for money is quite inelastic with respect to the variables in  v, equation ... [(2)1 
zives at most a theory of money income". ani  does not tell us the breakdown of this change 
xtween prices and real  income.  AI. tirst glance the presence of the phrase "at most" is surprrsing. 
But  it is  needed to deal wirli a complication. Except in  the special case in  which the real income 
:lasticity  of demand for money is unity. when the quantity of money rises the increase in  nominal 
Income required to restore equilibrium depends upon the breakdown of this increase in nominal 
income between prices and real income. l4 By saying "at most" Friedman protects himself from rhe 
criticism that he has ignored a significant difficulty for the quantity theory, without having to take 
up a complication that reduces the quantity theory's ability to  predict nominal incon~e.'~ 
6. What Distinguishes the Quantity Theory from Keynesian Theory? 
Since the portfolio theory that makes up such a large part of  the essay is essentially uncontroversial 
Friedman then asks what it means to say that somebody rejects the quantity theory. He mentions three points of contention between quantity theorists and Keynesians:  "(i) the stability and 
importance of the demand function for  money; (ii) the independence of the factors affecting 
demand and supply: and (iii) the form of the demand function or related functions.'' (Friedman, 
1956. p. 15). He does not discuss explicitly two other disagreements. 
One, which later played a central role in  his debate with his critics (Friedman,  1972). is that  in 
Keynesian theory either prices are: taken as rigid or at least as very slow to adjust. or else the 
analysis is applicable only to the early effects of an increase in the money supply. Perhaps he did 
not discuss this because in 1956 he had  not yet worked it out. 
The second disagreement that Friedman does not take up explicitly, is the difference in the 
research heuristics of the two theories. This difference is not relevant if  one thinks about theories in 
the narrow sense of the term, as is frequently done in economics. and was probably even more 
common in  1956. when Thomas Kuhn's Re  Srrucrure of  Scientific Revolutiotls had  not yet 
appeared. But  it is  likely that preference for one set of  research heuristics over the other plays a 
significant implicit  role in  one's choice between the Keynesian and quantity theories.  It seems 
plausible that Keynesian theory reaps an (unfair) advantage from an intuitive feeling that one's 
expenditures depend  more on one:'s income than on one's money holdings. Moreover. there is  the 
QWERTY problem. many economists had  invested much  intellectual capital in the Keynesian 
program. Hence. by  not discussing research strategies e_uplicirlv Friedman reduce opposit~on  to his 
essay. regardless of whether or not that was his motive. 
Implicitly, however, the choice between Keynesian and quantity-theory  research strategies 
shows up twice in  Friedman's essay. One instance is  that: 
The quantity theorist not only regards the demand function for  money as stable: he 
also regards  it as  playing a vital  role in  determining variables that he considers of 
great importance . .  . .  It is this that leads him to put greater emphasis on the demand 
for money than on, let us say. the demand for pins, even though the latter might be 
as stable as the former. It is not easy to state this point precisely, and  I  cannot pre- 
tend to have done so.  (Friedman, 1956. p. 16) 
Although. as Friedman says,, it may be hard  to state preciselv, the general ideas that monel 
unlike pins directly enters every market. and that wages and prices are set in  money terms. are 
points that the reader should find obvious and uncontroversial - unlike the idea that one can predict nominal income better by  looking at the money supply than by looking at the standard Keynesian 
variables. The other place is  Friedman's claim that the empirical studies included in  his book show 
how  fruitfully the quantity theory can be applied to macroeconomic problems. 
On the first point of  the three points of contention that he does take up Friedman (1956, p. 16) 
compares the quantity theorists'  belief that the demand for money  is  stable with the belief that: 
"The demand for money ... is a will-0'-the wisp, shifting erratically and unpredictably with every 
rumor and expectation." Friedman does not explicitly call this belief "Keynesian", but since he 
attributes it to the 1930s the reader may easily get the impression that this is what Keynesian 
believe. And as the previous citatiosns from  Hansen and the Radcliffe Committee illustrate some 
Keynesians held such an  extreme view. But  it is  not an adequate representation of the entire 
spectrum of  Keynesian think~ng,  let alone of all anti-quantity-theory thinking.  Thus. some 
Keynesians fitted demand function for money. or for what they considered the mostly volatile 
umponent of  money, idle (or speculative) balances. using only the interest rate and  not  rumors and 
expectations. (See Brown, 1939; Kalecki. 1940; Tobin.  1947.) 
Furthermore, Keynesian emphasis on  the instability of the money demand function had 
decreased since 1936.  11 is  likely t!hat by  1956 Friedman's rejection of the will-0'-the wisp view 
seemed reasonable to the majority of  Keynesians. Friedman should therefore have clarified that this 
point of contention is one between quantity theorists and what might be called extreme Keynesians. 
such as the post-Keynesian school. But  Friedman might reply that he  is  not responsible if readers 
confuse his phrase "in the 1930's" (Friedman. 1956. p. 16) with present-day Keynesian theory. 
Moreover.  Friedman (1956, p. 16) also challenges the more moderate Keynesian position by 
writing that:  "The quantity theorist accepts the empirical hypothesis that the demand for money  is 
highly stable - more stable than functions such as the consumption function that are offered as 
alternative key  relations."  He points out that by stability he means not numerical stability, but a 
stable functional relation between the real  quantity of  money demanded and a few specified 
variables. This the shift of focus from numerical to functional stability is a main contributions of 
his essay. 
But, as already discussed. functional stability, unlike numerical stability does provide a channel. the interest rate, by  which other Keynestan variables can affect nominal income. Hence a 
functionally stable demand for money is only a necessary, but not a suffic~ent  condition for the 
validity of  Friedman's quantity theory. He does not discuss this problem, perhaps largely because 
of  his methodological preference for testing theories by  their implications and  not  by  their 
assumptions. If  it turns out that most of  the observed changes in  income can be explained by 
exogenous changes in  the money supply, and not by  the effect of changes in  the interest rate on the 
demand for money, then the causes of changes in  the interest rate are not so important.  Not 
discussing this backdoor channel for Keynesian variables also has a rhetorical advantage since 11 
simplifies the exposition, and avoids the need to defend the quantity theory at an addition point. a 
point at which it would have been hard to obtain convincing evidence either way. 
The secoltd point of contentison relates to an  'sue  that would  later become central to the 
monetarist debate. the direction of causation between money and  income. (See Hammond.  1996b.) 
Friedman takes a moderate position. claiming only that causation runs from money to income some 
"there  are  important factors affecting the  supply of  money  that do  not  affect the 
demand  for  money.  Under  some  circumstances  these  are  technical  conditions 
affecting the supply of  specie:  under others. political and  psychological conditions 
determining  the  policies  of  monetary authorities and  the  banking system.  (Fried- 
man, 1956, p.  16.) 
He then describes the real bills doctrine as "the classic version of  the objection" to the quantity 
theory on  the issue of  d~rection  of  causation. l6 In calling the real bills doctrine the classic 
objection Friedman is correct. and he also gains a rhetorical point. since the real bills doctrine is  in 
very bad  repute among monetary economists. But this is so mainly because of  its normative 
element - that the  money supply sllould change to accommodate changes in  the demand for money 
rather than its prediction of  how  the  money supply does behave. Hence reference to the real bills 
doctrine should not be considered a sufficient answer to the  "reverse-causation"  criticism. 
Moreover. the casual reader may confuse the "classic objection"  with the strongest objection, and 
thus obtain a misleading impression of the seriousness of the reverse-causation problem. 
However, Friedman does riot dismiss this problem merely by  referring to the real bills 
doctrine. but goes on to say that there are important determinants of  the  money supply that arc independent of the demand for money. This makes  it possible - for specific cases in  which these 
determinants can be  snown to operate to  test, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) subsequently did. 
the quantity-theory hypothesis that when the money supply changes nominal income changes in a 
predictable way. But it does not provide a justification for a much stronger quantity-theory 
hypothesis: that most of the observed changes in  nominal income are due to exogenous changes in 
the money supply. And  it does not justify the practice, so common in  the 1960s and  1970s. of 
interpreting a good fit in a regression of income on the money supply as a confirmation of  the 
quantity theory. While Friedman does not deny that,  it is something that a hasty reader of  his essay 
may overlook 
Friedman's third point of contention is the slope of the liquidity preference function 
The attack on the quantity theory a,sociated  with  the Keynesian underemployment 
analysis  is  . . . [that the] demand  for  money,  it  is  said,  is  infinitely elastic  at  a 
"small"  positive interest rate. At  this interest rate, which can be expected to prevail 
under under-employ men^: conditions,  chmges in  the real  supply of  money  . . . have 
no effect on anything. (Friedman, 1956, p. 17.) 
This is a point where Friedm,an's rhetoric is  bad  because he does not state his argument clearly 
and unambiguously. On the one hand, the just cited passage could be read simply as a descriptive 
statement about what Keynesians believe (or perhaps what Keynes himself believed in 1936). 
without this being a necessary condition for the validity of Keynesian theory. If  this is all  that 
Friedman intends it is  puzzling why  he singled  it out as one of three points of contention. 
Alternatively, because of  the prominent position that Friedman gives it, one m~ght  read  it as 
meaning that unless the interest elasticity of demand for money is  infinite Keynesian theory is 
invalid. But if  that is what he inte:nds, how can he expect the reader to understand this argument 
without detailed explanation? In a classic paper Tobin (1947) had argued that the quantity theory 
(classical economics) is valid if. and only if, the demands for money  is completely interest 
inelastic, while Keynesian theory is valid both if  the demand for money is  infinitely elastic and  it' it 
has a finite, but nonzero (negative) elasticity.  Friedman should have expected many, of  his readers 
to be familiar with Tobin's position and to have accepted  it. Yet he does not offer an explicit 
response, such as Tobin's failure to take price changes and wealth effects into account. He should 
therefore have expected that readers would find his position puzzling rather than persuasive. Why then did he not explain his position? One can only conjecture. One possibility is  that he 
had  not yet worked out sufficiently the analysis he would present in subsequent papers (Friedman. 
1970, 1972). This is that. unless the interest elasticity of demand for money infinite. an increase in 
the quantity of money initially lowers interest rates at least slightly. This results in an increase in 
expenditures until prices have rken enough to bring the real  quantity of money back to its previous 
level. And that requires as the quantity theory predicts. that prices have risen in  proportion to the 
quantity of money. Only if  the interest elasticity of demand for money is infinite, or if  prices are 
fixed does this process not occur. (For a further discussion see Mayer, 1976) But Friedman should 
not have expected the reader to understand an analysis that he would not present until  many years 
afterward. 
Moreover, is  Friedman correct in  claiming that to have a coherent theory Keynesians must 
assume that the demand for money is  infinitely elastic. so that Keynesian theory is a special case'! 
Instead.  they can assume that. over the relevant horizon, prices are sticky. That is a common 
featurr of  Keynesian models.  Hence. Friedman should in  this essay have tried to justify his 
unconventional  readmg of Keynesian economics. 
He does so in a subsequent lpaper (Friedman. 1971). responding to Patinkin's (1972)  criticism. 
There he cites numerous passages from the  Get~eral  Theoiy in support. But  it is doubtful that these 
support his clairn.I7 And even  i.f in  1936 Keynes had assumed that the liquidity preference functior 
is infinitely elastic. this does not  mean that  Keynesian economists in  1956 did so too.l8 As already 
mentioned. Tobin (1947)  explicitly identified  Keynesian theory with any negative interest 
elasticity. And already in the early years of the Keynesian revolution when Brown (1993) and 
Kalecki (1940) fitted liquidity preference functions and obtained downward sloping curves. they 
did not remark that this was inconsistent with Keynesian theory. 
Given these problems with ithe third point of contention one should ask why Friedman took  it 
up at all. Again, one can only conjecture.  Perhaps it  is because he believed that readers would 
ohjec~  if  he did not discuss the interest elasticities. Previously there had been much discussion 
about whether Keynes' basic innovation was the "discovery" of the interest elasticitv of liquidity 
prctcrence, or his assumption of wage and price inflexibility.  By  1956 it should have been clear to everyone that to the extent it was either.  it was the latter. (See Patinkin, 1948) But the degree ot 
wage and price flexibility required to reduce unemployment depends, in  part, on tne interest 
elasticities of liquidity preference and of expenditures. Hence these interest elasticities are of much 
interest even if  they are not fundamental 
7. Friedman's Concluding Section 
Saying that "the proof of the pudding is in  the eating" Friedrnan then discusses the empirical 
chapters of the book, which apply the quantity theory to various situations. Eugene Lerner explains 
intlation in  the Confederacy, and Phillip Cagan explains hyperinflation. something that had 
previously been considered outside the scope of the quantity theory. And Richard Selden shows 
that velocity in  the U.S. has been a stable function of a few variables over a long period. Only 
German inflat~on  during World War 11  resists a fi ly  satisfactory explanation by  the quantity 
theory, and that can be accounted for by the Draconian system of price control 
Toward the end of the book Friedman makes a strong claim: 
One of  the chief  reproaches directed  at economics as  an allegedly  empirical sci- 
ence is  that it can offer so few numerical "constants", that is  that it  has isolated so 
few fundamental regularities.  'The field of money is one of the chief examples one 
can offer in  rebuttal: then: is  perhaps no other empirical  relation  in  economics that 
has been observed to recur so uniformly  under so wide a variety of circumstances 
as  the  relation  between  substantial  changes  over  short  periods  in  the  stock  of 
money and in prices; the one  is  invariably linked with the other and is  in the same 
direction: this uniformity is,  I  suspect, of the same order as  many of the uniformi- 
ties that form the basis of the physical sciences. 
This passage provides the reader with powerful  motive to reconsider the quantity theory. And 
given the prevailing Keynesian consensus such a powerful motive was needed, both because of the 
substantial effort required, and because of a natural reluctance to change one's mind. But 
subsequently it has been cited gleefully by  Keynesians who point to the high monetary growth rate 
that accompanied the falling inflation rate of the 1980s. (See, for instance, Benjamin Friedman and 
Kenneth Kuttner, 1992.) Whether that experience really does invalidate the above passage depends 
on how one interprets the word "substantial". If  Friedman meant with it an annual growth rate of. 
say 20 percent. then it has yet to be disconfirmed.  Friedman's statement seem startling and 
provocative. but is so vague that il:  has little content. 8. Conclusion 
The preponderance of  a moderate Keynesian consensus in  the 1950 shaped the way  Friedman 
presented the case for  the quantit:y theory. His primary task had  to be to convince economists to 
reconsider this theory. This required an ecumenical presentation that would not drive off potential 
readers who were committed Keynesians. At the same time it required making some strong claims 
for the quantity theory to provide a sufficient incentive to reconsider it. A combination of  "sweet 
reason" and shock tactics was needed. Friedman succeeded brilliantly in  this rhetorical task. And 
he  did so in  way that made it hard for his opponznts to  reasonably claim that he was employing 
"rhetoric" in  the derogatory sense of the term. Nothing in  his essay indicates that he followed 
Keynes (1924, p. 427) who tells 11s in  his Treatise on Probabilio: "In writing a book of  this kind 
the author must, if  he is  to put  hi!;  polnt of view clearly, pretend sometimes to a little nlore 
conviction than he  feels.  He  must give his argument a chance, so to speak. not  be  too ready to 
depress its vitality with a wet cloud ot  doubt." 
ENDNOTES 
*.  I am  indebted for helpful comrnents to Milton Friedman and  Matthew Rafferty 
1. In  his 1970 paper Friedman tried to accommodate the demands of  his critics that he state his 
implicit model by  reformulating his analysis in an IS-LM framework. This framework is  unconge- 
nial  to him since it takes prices as  fixed (and hence does not distinguish between nominal and real 
interest rates). and because it assumes that money is a substitute only for bonds and not for 
commodities. Apart from that unsuccessful attempt to communicate with his critics Friedman added 
only two major theoretical element in  his subsequent wr~tings  on the quantity theory. One is the 
vertical Phillips curve. The other is that price flexibility ensures that changes in  the nominal quantity 
of  money do not lead to permanent or even long-run changes in  the real quantity of  money. 
(Friedman. 1968, 1972) 
2. This does not necessarily mean that a majority  if all economists had become Keynesians. Since a 
large proportion of  economists at that time did not publish, their views are largely unknown. But 
among those who did publish the Keynesian paradigm ruled. Here are some anecdotes to illustrate its 
dominance. When as a graduate student in  1948-50 I  had to read a book on macro I  would check thc 
index to see how often Keynes was mentioned.  If there were only a few citations I  was reluctant to 
read the book. In  the summer of  1956  1 taught a graduate macro course, using as  a text Friedman's 
Studies in the Quantiq Theon, of  Monq, which had been published a few months earlier.  When  I 
asked students to comment on  the: course one student responded that I should have used a more 
up-to-date text. Some time after that  I  was talking to a colleague when a student from my  graduate 
monetary theory course came up and asked a question about the quantity theory. My colleague was 
surprised and asked me  "who is still teaching the quantity theory?" 
3. In  this context the term  "prediction" should be  interpreted broadly as referring not just to 
forecasting some magnitude, such as the price level, but also to the theory's quantitative implica- 
tions. This greatly reduces the distinction between prediction and explanation. Much of  Friedman's way  is concerned with relating the demand for money, and hence the quantity theory, to the general 
theory of demand for durable goods;, and thus with  "explaining". But the acid test to Friedman is 
whether the theory predicts sufficie:ntly well. 
i..  This purpose is also served by  the next paragraph in  which Friedman writes that:  "the quantity 
theory is  in  the first instance a theory of  the demand for money. It is not a theory of output, or of 
rnoney income or the price level."  (Friedman, 1956, p. 4) This passage probably surprised many 
readers (it certainly did me) and hence undermined the reader's belief that she already knew what the 
quantity theory is. Friedman's statement is correct because it is qualified by the phrase "in the flrst 
instance", but traditionally the quantity theory had been considered a theory of the price level or 
rnoney income. Johnson (1971, p. 10) points out that calling the quantity theory a theory of the 
demand for money shields it from tlhe criticism that it assumed that the economy automatically 
returns to full employment, "which was manifestly in conflict with the facts of experience." But the 
full employment assumption, while part of long-run classical theory, is  not part, or at least not a 
prominent part of the quantity theory. The business cycles that Fisher (1922, Ch. 4) described 
showed unemployment that was consistent with experience. 
L . Subsequently Friedman (1972) explained that he had in  mind the policy recommendations of 
economists at the LSE in  the 1930s. But neither of the two senior economists at the LSE was a 
cluantity theorist. Friedrich von Hayek (1931) devoted an entire chapter to a criticism of the quantity 
theory, while Lionel Robbins (1934) was also critical of a quantity-theory explanation of fluctua- 
tions. By  contrast, leading quantity theorists, such as Irving Fisher and Clark Warburton advocated 
policies much more in line with Friedman's. 
ft. That may seem contrary to Friedman's insistence on using the quantity of  money instead of  the 
rate of  interest as the central variable. But Friedman does so for a practical reason, the difficulty of 
measuring the theoretical term  "the rate of  interest", and this is  not relevant for the theoretical issues 
ciscussed in  his essay. Friedman could also have obtained the main quantity-theory results by 
assuming more price flexibility than  Keynesians did. 7. Nor is  it the way Friedman thinks of  it now. 
He  now regrets his "ofhand comment" to Patinkin on the Keynesian origins of his theory, a 
comment resulting more from "friendliness and fundamental disinterest in origins as opposed to 
c'utcomes than any serious consideration of  the origin of  ideas." (Friedman, 1996) 
7.  The Chicago school has a strong sense of loyalty 
E. Johnson (1971, p. 9) also writes that it helps to introduce old concepts under "confusing new 
tames", and cites as instances the substitution of permanent illcome for wealth, and the "dragg~ng 
across the trail of  the red herring of  human capital." But the term "permanent income"  is sufficiently 
well explained by  Friedman, and ecen if  it might have been confusing in  1956 the publication of  A 
Theory of rhe Consumption Function the next year made it familiar to economists.  Nor does the 
concept of  human capital seem confusing. 
51.  For surveys of  the literature on the interest elasticity of business investment see Meyer and Kuh 
(1963, pp. 340-41) and Eisner and Strotz (1963, pp. 227 and 232). Studies of  residential construc- 
tion attributed substantially greater importance to the interest rate (see Grebler and Maisel, 1963. pp. 
608-609), but even so, this sector was not considered as interest sensitive then as it was later thought 
to be  when Regulation Q became a serious constraint on intermediation. The response of consump- 
tion to interest rate changes was considered "negligible" (Suits, 1963, pp. 40-41) 10.  It is also 
possible that Friedman saw little benefit from phrasing his discussion in Keynesian language. Clark 
Warburton (1946) had  used  Keynesian language to present a quantity-theory criticism of  Keynes~an 
theory on empirical grounds, and his paper was largely ignored. For a discussion of Warburton as a 
predecessor of  Friedman see Cargill (1979). 
I  1. The Cambridge version of  the quantity theory (Pigou, 1917) was less subject to this criticisnl 
than the transactions version since it did provided some microfoundations, but these were not worked out in  the more precise and detailed way  that had become popular by  the 1950s. Moreover. 
in  the U.S. the transactions version predominated.  For its time Pigou's (1917) exposition was 
extraordinarily sophisticated. He not only included in  the cost of  holding money expected inflation. 
but also made allowance for a m,oney substitute.  ::ade  credit, reducing the demand for money, as 
well as for lagged money holdings having a positive effect on current holdings. 
12.  The microfoundations that Friedman provided were not as elegant as those that Baumol (1952) 
and Tobin (1956) provided for the transactions demand, and Tobin (1958) for the speculative (or it 
is  sometimes asserted the precautionary) demand. But while the Baumol-Tobin microfoundations are 
better suited for microeconomic work, Friedman's are better suited for macroeconomics with  its 
greater emphasis on measurability (see Hammond,  1996a) and prediction. 
13. On the assumption that the ratio of  human to nonhuman wealth is constant the possibility of 
switching between wealth and income is convenient for Friedman. Since he stresses the store-of- 
wealth function of  money he should use wealth and not income as the budget constraint in  his money 
demand function. But the available data do not measure wealth as accurately as income, and also it is 
changes in  nominal income, not changes in  wealth, that Friedman wants to explain. 
14. Suppose the money supply increases by  10 percent, and that the real income elasticity of demand 
for money is 0.5. Ceteris paribus equilibrium requires a 10 percent rise in  nominal income if  real 
income is constant and only prices rise, but a 20 pqrcent rise in  nominal income if prices are 
constant and only real income rises.  For long rui~  analysis one can respond to this problem by 
claiming that over the long run ~memployment  is at the natural rate so that real income is constant. 
15. It is  not clear how  important this complicaticn is. To an academic economist concerned with 
predicting or explaining changes in  nominal income it is  very important. But a policy-maker is  more 
likely to be concerned with predicting real  income and  prices separately than with predicting nominal 
Income. 
16. The real bills doctrine (already found  in the  Wealth of  Nations) stated that as long as banks issue 
bank notes or loans only to finance real (i.e. not speculative) activity they will not be issued to 
excess since the increased demand created by additional bank notes or loans will be  met by  an 
increased supply of goods and services.  Any excess bank notes issued will be returned to the banks 
since the public will  not want to hold  them. The same is  true for bank credit. Hence, as long as 
banks avoid lending for speculative activity the central bank should let the supply of  money and bank 
credit expand or contract in acco~rdance  with the demand for  it. 
17. For example. the first passage Friedman (1972. p. 945, emphasis added) cites is:  "Circums- 
tances mav develop in which evm a large increase in  the quantity of  money may exert a compara- 
tively small influence on the rate: of  interest."  First.  "may" is  not the same as "does". and  more 
importantly "comparatively small"  is  not the same as  "no". 
18. In  a subsequent paper (Friedman, 1964) wrote that many Keynesians now think that it is only 
seldom that liquidity preference is  absolute. References 
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